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Abstract Optimizing the ratio between the maximum length of the shares and the length of the secret
value in secret sharing schemes for general access structures is an extremely difficult and long-standing
open problem. In this paper, we study it for bipartite access structures, in which the set of participants
is divided in two parts, and all participants in each part play an equivalent role. We focus on the search
of lower bounds by using a special class of polymatroids that is introduced here, the bipartite ones. We
present a method based on linear programming to compute, for every given bipartite access structure,
the best lower bound that can be obtained by this combinatorial method. In addition, we obtain some
general lower bounds that improve the previously known ones, and we construct optimal secret sharing
schemes for a family of bipartite access structures.
Key words. Cryptography, secret sharing, multipartite secret sharing, polymatroids, linear program-
ming.
1 Introduction
Secret sharing, which was introduced in 1979 by Shamir [37] and Blakley [6], has important applications
in cryptography as a building block of many different kinds of cryptographic protocols. A secret sharing
scheme is a method to protect a secret value by distributing it into shares among a set of participants
in such a way that only certain qualified subsets of participants can recover the secret by pooling their
shares. Only unconditionally secure, perfect secret sharing schemes are considered in this work. In such
schemes the shares of the participants in an unqualified subset do not provide any information at all
about the secret value. The family of the qualified subsets is called the access structure of the scheme.
It is monotone, which means that any superset of a qualified subset is qualified, and so every access
structure is determined by the family of its minimal qualified subsets.
The relation between the maximum length of the shares and the length of the secret is commonly
used as a measure for the efficiency of secret sharing schemes. The complexity of a secret sharing scheme
is defined as the ratio between the maximum length of the shares and the length of the secret. If all
shares have the same length as the secret, which is the best possible situation, then both the scheme and
its access structure are said to be ideal. Ito, Saito, Nishizeki [26] proved that there is a secret sharing
scheme for every access structure, and so it is natural to consider the optimal complexity σ(Γ ) of an access
structure Γ , which is the infimum of the complexities of all secret sharing schemes for Γ . Determining the
optimal complexity for general access structures has appeared to be an extremely difficult open problem.
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2The asymptotic behavior of this parameter is unknown and there is a huge distance between the best
known general lower and upper bounds.
In a linear secret sharing scheme, the secret value and the shares are vectors over some finite field,
and every share is the value of a given linear map on some random vector. Because of their homomorphic
properties, linear secret sharing schemes are very useful in some applications of secret sharing as, for
instance, multiparty computation. In addition, both the computation of the shares and the recovery of
the secret value can be efficiently performed. For an access structure Γ , we notate λ(Γ ) for the infimum
of the complexities of all linear secret sharing schemes for Γ . Of course, σ(Γ ) ≤ λ(Γ ).
Constructions of secret sharing schemes for a given access structure Γ provide upper bounds on σ(Γ ).
Several methods to construct secret sharing schemes with low complexity have been presented in [9,12,
20,28,40] and other works. In most cases, these constructions provide linear schemes, and hence, upper
bounds on λ(Γ ). On the other hand, lower bounds on the optimal complexity have been obtained in [7,
8,13,28] by deriving inequalities on the Shannon entropies of the random variables involved in a secret
sharing scheme. Csirmaz [15] pointed out that those lower bounds could be obtained by a combinatorial
method, simplifying and unifying in this way the techniques in those previous works. Specifically, lower
bounds on the optimal complexity can be derived from the fact that that every secret sharing scheme for a
given access structure defines a polymatroid. A new parameter, κ(Γ ), was introduced in [29] to denote the
best lower bound on σ(Γ ) that can be obtained by this combinatorial method. Obviously, κ(Γ ) ≤ σ(Γ ).
Determining the value of κ(Γ ) for a given access structure is a linear programming problem [16,17,36].
Linear programming has been applied in a different way to secret sharing in [9,40] and other works.
Therefore, most of the known lower and upper bounds on σ(Γ ) are, respectively, lower bounds on
κ(Γ ) and upper bounds on λ(Γ ). Even though our knowledge about the behavior of the parameters κ
and λ can still be improved, several results indicate that new techniques are needed in the research on the
open problem that is considered here. For instance, Csirmaz [15] proved that κ(Γ ) ≤ n for every access
structure Γ on n participants, while λ(Γ ) grows much faster [1,4,24]. In addition, by using non-Shannon
information inequalities [43], a separation result between the parameters κ and σ was presented in [2].
A slightly larger gap was proved in [34]. A stronger separation result between the parameters σ and λ
was given in [4].
Because of its difficulty, the open problem of determining the optimal complexity of every given
access structure has been considered for several particular families of access structures. The value of
that parameter has been determined for almost all access structures on five participants [28]. The same
applies for the ones defined by graphs with six vertices [19]. Recently, the problem has been solved for the
family of the access structures defined by trees [18]. Nevertheless, only partial results have been obtained
for most of the families that have been considered, as the ones defined by graphs [8,16], the weighted
threshold ones [5], or the ones with at most four minimal qualified subsets [30].
The qualified sets in a threshold access structure are those having at least a certain number of
elements, and hence all participants have the same role. Two different methods to construct ideal secret
sharing schemes for threshold access structures were proposed in the seminal works on the topic [6,
37]. Multipartite access structures, in which the set of participants is divided into several parts and all
participants in the same part play an equivalent role in the structure, are a natural generalization of
the threshold case. A number of constructions of ideal secret sharing schemes for different families of
multipartite access structures can be found in the literature, for instance [10,38,41,42]. In addition, the
characterization of ideal multipartite access structures have been studied in [3,21,22,35]. In particular,
the ideal bipartite [35] and tripartite [21] access structures have been completely characterized.
The open problem of determining the optimal complexity is studied in this paper for the family of
the bipartite access structures. This line of work was initiated in [35], where several lower and upper
bounds were presented. By using the geometric representation introduced in [35], in which the sets of
participants are represented by integer points on the plane, we study the behavior of the parameter κ
in this family by introducing the special class of the bipartite polymatroids. In particular, we prove that
the value of this parameter depends only on the relative position of the points representing the minimal
qualified subsets, and it is independent from the number of participants in every part. We show how the
linear programming problem to compute κ(Γ ) can be greatly simplified for bipartite access structures
by using bipartite polymatroids, and we use this method to determine the value of this parameter for
several particular structures. In addition, new general lower bounds on the optimal complexity of bipartite
access structures are presented, improving the ones in [35]. Finally, we determine the value of σ(Γ ) for
3all bipartite access structures with two minimal qualified points, one of them involving only one of the
parts. This is done by constructing optimal linear secret sharing schemes for those access structures.
2 Preliminaries
Several definitions and basic facts as well as the main known results about the optimization of secret
sharing schemes for general access structures are surveyed in this section. A more detailed exposition
can be found in the full version of [29].
Secret sharing schemes are defined as collections of finite random variables whose joint Shannon
entropies must satisfy certain conditions. The reader is referred to [14] for a textbook containing basic
information about Shannon entropies. Specifically, consider a finite set Q of participants, a finite set
E with a probability distribution on it, and, for every i ∈ Q, a finite set Ei and a surjective map
pii : E → Ei. Every map pii induces a random variable on the set Ei. Let H(Ei) denote the Shannon
entropy of this random variable. For a subset A = {i1, . . . , ir} ⊆ Q, we write H(EA) for the joint
entropy H(Ei1 . . . Eir ), and a similar convention is used for conditional entropies as, for instance, in
H(Ej |EA) = H(Ej |Ei1 . . . Eir ). Consider a distinguished participant p0 ∈ Q, which is usually called
dealer , and an access structure Γ on the set P = Qr{p0}. The maps pii define an unconditionally secure
perfect secret sharing scheme Σ with access structure Γ if the following properties are satisfied.
1. H(Ep0 |EA) = 0 if A ∈ Γ .
2. H(Ep0 |EA) = H(Ep0) if A /∈ Γ .
In this situation, every random choice of an element x ∈ E according to the given probability distribution
results in a distribution of shares (si)i∈Q, where si = pii(x) ∈ Ei is the share of the participant i ∈ P and
s = sp0 = pip0(x) ∈ Ep0 is the shared secret value. Observe that the first requirement in the definition
implies that the qualified subsets can recover the secret value from their shares and, by the second one,
the shares of the participants in an unqualified subset do not provide any information at all about the
secret value.
We define the complexity σ(Σ) of a secret sharing scheme Σ as the ratio between the maximum
length of the shares and the length of the secret, that is, σ(Σ) = maxi∈P H(Ei)/H(Ep0). For each
participant i ∈ P , H(Ei) ≥ H(Ep0), and hence σ(Σ) ≥ 1. A secret sharing scheme Σ with σ(Σ) = 1 is
said to be ideal , and its access structure is called ideal as well. The optimal complexity σ(Γ ) of an access
structure Γ is defined as the infimum of the complexities σ(Σ) of the secret sharing schemes for Γ .
E and Ei are vector spaces over a finite field K, the mappings pii are linear, and the uniform probability
distribution is taken on E. Observe that the complexity of a linear secret sharing scheme is equal to
maxi∈P dimEi/ dimEp0 . Therefore a linear scheme is ideal if dimEi = dimEp0 for every i ∈ P . An ideal
linear scheme with Ei = K for every i ∈ Q is called a K-vector space secret sharing scheme, and its access
structure is said to be a K-vector space access structure. Every access structure admits a linear secret
sharing scheme [26], and we notate λ(Γ ) for the infimum of the complexities of the linear secret sharing
schemes with access structure Γ . Obviously, σ(Γ ) ≤ λ(Γ ) for every access structure Γ .
We notate P(Q) for the power set of Q. The map h : P(Q)→ R defined by h(X) = H(EX)/H(Ep0)
for every X ⊆ Q satisfies the following properties.
1. h(∅) = 0.
2. h is monotone increasing : if X ⊆ Y ⊆ Q, then h(X) ≤ h(Y ).
3. h is submodular : if X,Y ⊆ Q, then h(X ∪ Y ) + h(X ∩ Y ) ≤ h(X) + h(Y ).
4. h(A ∪ {p0}) ∈ {h(A), h(A) + 1} for every A ⊆ P .
Every pair S = (Q, h) formed by a finite set Q and a map h : P(Q) → R satisfying the first three
properties above is a polymatroid . The set Q and the map h are called, respectively, the ground set and
the rank function of S. This connection between the joint entropies of a family of random variables and
polymatroids was first pointed out by Fujishige [23]. If a polymatroid S = (Q, h) satisfies the fourth
property above, we say that p0 is an atomic point of S.
Every polymatroid S = (Q, h) with an atomic point p0 ∈ Q defines an access structure Γp0(S) on the
set P = Qr {p0} by
Γp0(S) = {A ⊆ P : h(A ∪ {p0}) = h(A)}.
4In this situation, we say that S is a Γ -polymatroid.
Therefore, every secret sharing scheme Σ defines a polymatroid S = S(Σ) = (Q, h) such that the
dealer p0 is an atomic point of S. Moreover, the access structure Γ of Σ is univocally determined by the
polymatroid S because Γ = Γp0(S). For a polymatroid S = (Q, h), we define σ(S) = max{h({i}) : i ∈
Q}. Observe that σ(Σ) = σ(S(Σ)) for every secret sharing scheme Σ.
A polymatroid is said to be integer if its rank function is integer-valued. A matroid is an integer
polymatroidM = (Q, r) such that r(A) ≤ |A| for all A ⊆ Q. For a finite field K, an integer polymatroid
S = (Q, h) is K-representable if there exist a K-vector space V and, for every i ∈ Q, a subspace Vi ⊆ V
such that h(X) = dim(
∑
i∈X Vi) for every X ⊆ Q. In particular, a matroidM = (Q, r) is K-representable
if there exists a set of vectors {vi : i ∈ Q} in some K-vector space V such that r(X) is equal to the
dimension of the subspace spanned by the vectors in {vi : i ∈ X} for every X ⊆ Q.
Let S1 = (Q, h1) and S2 = (Q, h2) be two polymatroids on the same ground set. Clearly, h = h1 +h2
is the rank function of a polymatroid on Q, which is called the sum of S1 and S2 and is denoted by
S1 +S2 = (Q, h). For every polymatroid (Q, h), the pair (Q, ah) is also a polymatroid for any a ∈ R with
a > 0.
A polymatroid S = (Q, h) is said to be entropic if there exist a family of random variables (Ei)i∈Q
and a real number a > 0 such that h(A) = aH(EA) for every A ⊆ Q. If these random variables are
K-linear , that is, if they are defined from surjective linear maps pii : E → Ei, where E and Ei for i ∈ Q
are K-vector spaces and the uniform probability distribution is taken on E, then the polymatroid S is
said to be K-linearly entropic. By considering, for i ∈ Q, the subspaces (kerpii)⊥ of the dual space E∗,
it is easy to prove that a polymatroid S = (Q, h) is K-linearly entropic if and only if there exist a real
number b > 0 such that (Q, bh) is a K-representable integer polymatroid.
Proposition 1 The sum of K-representable integer polymatroids is K-representable.
Proof Let S1 = (Q, h1) and S2 = (Q, h2) be two integer polymatroids on the same ground set. Consider
two K-vector spaces V and W and two families of subspaces, (Vi)i∈Q with Vi ⊆ V and (Wi)i∈Q with
Wi ⊆ W , that are K-representations of the polymatroids S1 and S2, respectively. Then the subspaces
Vi ⊕Wi ⊆ V ⊕W form a K-representation of the integer polymatroid S1 + S2.
Let Γ be an access structure on the set P = Qr {p0} and let S = (Q, h) be a Γ -polymatroid. Then
S is entropic if and only if there exists a secret sharing scheme Σ with access structure Γ such that
S = S(Σ). Moreover, S is linearly entropic if and only if there exists a linear secret sharing scheme with
these properties. Because of that,
σ(Γ ) = inf{σ(S) : S is an entropic Γ -polymatroid}
and
λ(Γ ) = inf{σ(S) : S is a linearly entropic Γ -polymatroid}.
In addition, we define
κ(Γ ) = inf{σ(S) : S is a Γ -polymatroid}.
Clearly, κ(Γ ) ≤ σ(Γ ) ≤ λ(Γ ) for every access structure Γ .
If S = (Q, h) is a polymatroid and Q′ ⊆ Q, we consider the polymatroid S(Q′) = (Q′, h) defined by
restricting the rank function h to the subsets of Q′. In this situation, S is called an extension of S(Q′).
A polymatroid S = (P, h) is said to be compatible with an access structure Γ on P if there exists a
Γ -polymatroid S ′ = (Q, h) with Q = P ∪ {p0} and S = S ′(P ). Clearly,
κ(Γ ) = inf{σ(S) : S is a polymatroid compatible with Γ}.
Similar results do not hold for the parameters σ and λ because the extensions of a (linearly) entropic
polymatroid are not necessarily (linearly) entropic. The next result, which is a consequence of [15,
Proposition 2.3], characterizes the polymatroids that are compatible with a given access structure.
Proposition 2 ([15]) A polymatroid S = (P, h) is compatible with an access structure Γ on P if and
only if the following conditions are satisfied.
1. If A ⊆ B ⊆ P and A /∈ Γ while B ∈ Γ , then h(A) ≤ h(B)− 1.
52. If A,B ∈ Γ and A ∩B /∈ Γ , then h(A ∪B) + h(A ∩B) ≤ h(A) + h(B)− 1.
All elements in the ground set of a matroid are atomic points. An access structure Γ is a matroid port
if Γ = Γp0(S) for some matroid S = (Q, h). In this case κ(Γ ) = 1. Brickell and Davenport [11] proved
that S(Σ) is a matroid if Σ is an ideal secret sharing scheme. Therefore, every ideal access structure is
a matroid port. This result was generalized in [29].
Theorem 1 ([29]) If an access structure Γ is not a matroid port, then κ(Γ ) ≥ 3/2. In particular, every
access structure with σ(Γ ) < 3/2 is a matroid port.
The independent sequence method was introduced in [7] and subsequently improved in [35]. We use
the description of this method presented in [29], which is in terms of polymatroids, to obtain bounds on
the information rate of bipartite access structures. We present these bounds in Section 5.
Consider A ⊆ P and an increasing sequence of subsets B1 ⊆ · · · ⊆ Bm ⊆ P . We say that (B1, . . . , Bm |
A) is an independent sequence in Γ with length m and size s if |A| = s and, for every i = 1, . . . ,m there
exists Xi ⊆ A such that Bi ∪ Xi ∈ Γ , while Bm /∈ Γ and Bi−1 ∪ Xi /∈ Γ if i ≥ 2. The independent
sequence method is based on the following result.
Theorem 2 Let Γ be an access structure on the set P and let S = (Q, h) be a Γ -polymatroid on
Q = P ∪ {p0}. If there exists in Γ an independent sequence (B1, . . . , Bm | A) with length m and size s,
then h(A) ≥ m. As a consequence, κ(Γ ) ≥ m/s.
3 Bipartite Access Structures and Bipartite Polymatroids
Anm-partition Π = (X1, . . . , Xm) of a setX is a disjoint family ofm subsets ofX withX = X1∪· · ·∪Xm.
A permutation τ onX is said to be aΠ-permutation if τ(Xi) = Xi for every i = 1, . . . ,m. A combinatorial
object defined on X is said to be Π-partite if every Π-permutation on X is an automorphism of it. In
particular, a family of subsets Λ ⊆ P(X) is Π-partite if and only if τ(Λ) = {τ(A) : A ∈ Λ} = Λ for
every Π-permutation τ on X, and a polymatroid S = (X,h) with ground set X is Π-partite if and only
if h(A) = h(τ(A)) for every A ⊆ X and for every Π-permutation τ on X.
For every m-partition Π = (X1, . . . , Xm) of P , we consider the (m+ 1)-partition Π0 = (X1, . . . , Xm,
{p0}) of Q = P ∪{p0}. We prove in the following that, for every Π-partite access structure Γ ⊆ P(P ), the
values of κ(Γ ) and λ(Γ ) can be determined by considering only the Γ -polymatroids that are Π0-partite.
Proposition 3 Let Π = (X1, . . . , Xm) be an m-partition of a set P and let Π0 be the corresponding
(m+ 1)-partition of Q = P ∪ {p0}. Let Γ be a Π-partite access structure on P . Then
– κ(Γ ) = inf{σ(S) : S is a Π0-partite Γ -polymatroid }.
– λ(Γ ) = inf{σ(S) : S is a linearly entropic Π0-partite Γ -polymatroid }.
Proof Let Ψ be the set of the Π0-permutations on Q. Let S = (Q, h) be a Γ -polymatroid, and consider







for every X ⊆ Q. It is not difficult to check that S˜ = (Q, h˜) is a Π0-partite Γ -polymatroid with
σ(S˜) ≤ σ(S). Suppose now that S is K-linearly entropic for some finite field K. Then there exists a real
number b > 0 such that S ′ = (Q, bh) is a K-representable integer polymatroid. For a permutation τ
on Q, consider the integer polymatroid τS ′ = (Q, b(hτ)), where (hτ)(X) = h(τ(X)) for every X ⊆ Q.
Clearly, τS ′ is K-representable. Then the integer polymatroid S˜ ′ = ∑τ∈Ψ τS ′ is K-representable by
Proposition 1, and hence S˜ = 1/(b|Ψ |)S˜ ′ is linearly entropic.
Corollary 1 If Γ is a Π-partite access structure, then
κ(Γ ) = inf{σ(S) : S is a Π-partite polymatroid compatible with Γ }.
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introduced in [21,35]. We notate Z+ for the set of the non-negative integers, and we consider in Z2+
the order relation defined by (x1, y1) ≤ (x2, y2) if x1 ≤ x2 and y1 ≤ y2. For a bipartition Π = (X,Y )
of a set P , consider the mapping Π : P(P ) → Z2+ defined by Π(A) = (|A ∩ X|, |A ∩ Y |). We notate
P = Π(P(P )) = {(x, y) ∈ Z2+ : (x, y) ≤ Π(X)}. For a Π-partite access structure Γ on P , we consider
the set of integer points Π(Γ ) = {Π(A) : A ∈ Γ} ⊆ Z2+. Obviously, Π(Γ ) ⊆ P. Observe that A ⊆ P
is in Γ if and only if Π(A) ∈ Π(Γ ). Then Γ is completely determined by the set of points Π(Γ ). The
set of points Π(Γ ) is monotone increasing, that is, if (x1, y1), (x2, y2) ∈ P are such that (x1, y1) ∈ Π(Γ )
and (x1, y1) ≤ (x2, y2), then (x2, y2) ∈ Π(Γ ). Therefore, Γ is determined by the family minΠ(Γ ) of the
minimal points of Π(Γ ). Observe that the points in minΠ(Γ ) = {(x1, y1), . . . , (xr, yr)} can be ordered
in such a way that 0 ≤ x1 < x2 < · · · < xr and, in this situation, y1 > y2 > · · · > yr ≥ 0. We are going
to assume always that the points in minΠ(Γ ) are ordered in this way.
Consider the tripartition Π0 = (X,Y, {p0}) of the set Q = P ∪ {p0}. As before, for every A ⊆ Q, we
considerΠ0(A) = (|A∩X|, |A∩Y |, |A∩{p0}|) ∈ P×{0, 1} ⊆ Z3+. If S = (Q, h) is aΠ0-partite polymatroid,
then h(A) = h(B) if Π0(A) = Π0(B). Therefore, the polymatroid S is univocally determined by its
reduced rank function, which is the map ĥ : P × {0, 1} → R defined by ĥ(x, y, z) = h(A), where A ⊆ Q
is such that Π(A) = (x, y, z).
4 Duality and Minors
Duality and minors are operations on access structures, and also on matroids and polymatroids, that
are important in secret sharing. This is mainly due to the fact of the parameters that are considered
here have a good behavior with respect to those operations. In addition, minors of access structures
correspond to a natural scenario in secret sharing. Namely, if several participants leave the scheme and
maybe some of them reveal their shares, then the new access structure will be a minor of the original
one.
Let Γ be an access structure on a set P . For any B ⊆ P , we consider on the set P r B the access
structures Γ \B and Γ/B defined by
Γ \B = {A ⊆ P rB : A ∈ Γ} and Γ/B = {A ⊆ P rB : A ∪B ∈ Γ}.
These operations are called deletion and contraction, respectively. Any access structure obtained by a
sequence of deletions and contractions of subsets of P is a minor of Γ . The dual Γ ∗ of an access structure
Γ on P is the access structure on the same set defined by
Γ ∗ = {A ⊆ P : P rA /∈ Γ}.
Obviously, Γ ∗∗ = Γ . The next proposition, whose proof is straightforward, describes a useful connection
between these operations on access structures.
Proposition 4 Let Γ be and access structure on a set P . Then (Γ/B)∗ = Γ ∗\B for every subset B ⊆ P .
For a polymatroid S = (Q, h) and a subset B ⊆ Q, we consider the polymatroids S\B = (QrB, h\B)
and S/B = (Qr B, h/B) with h\B(X) = h(X) and h/B(X) = h(X ∪ B)− h(B) for every X ⊆ Qr B.
Every polymatroid that is obtained from S by a sequence of such operations is a minor of S. If S is a
Γ -polymatroid, then S \B is a (Γ \B)-polymatroid and S/B is a (Γ/B)-polymatroid. Because of that,
κ(Γ ′) ≤ κ(Γ ) if Γ ′ is a minor of Γ . In addition, the aforementioned connection between minors and
secret sharing implies that σ(Γ ′) ≤ σ(Γ ) and λ(Γ ′) ≤ λ(Γ ). The parameters λ and κ are invariant by
duality, as it was proved, respectively, in [27] and [29]. The relation between σ(Γ ) and σ(Γ ∗) is an open
problem.
Proposition 5 ([27,29]) For every access structure, λ(Γ ) = λ(Γ ∗) and κ(Γ ) = κ(Γ ∗).
If Γ is Π-partite for some partition Π = (P1, . . . , Pm) of the set P , then the dual access structure
Γ ∗ is Π-partite as well. If B ⊆ P , the minors Γ\B and Γ/B are (Π\B)-partite access structures, where
Π\B = (P1 rB, . . . , Pm rB).
We present in Propositions 6 and 7 two different minors Γ ′, Γ ′′ of a bipartite access structure Γ such
that κ(Γ ) = κ(Γ ′) = κ(Γ ′′). The validity of the analogous results for the parameters σ and λ is an open
problem.
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B ⊆ P be such that Π(P rB) = (xr, y1). Then κ(Γ \B) = κ(Γ ).
Proof Let S = (P r B, h) be a bipartite polymatroid compatible with Γ \ B, and consider its re-
duced rank function ĥ : Π(P(P r B)) → R. Consider the map ĥ′ : P → R defined by ĥ′(x, y) =
ĥ(min{x, xr},min{y, y1}). Clearly, this map defines a bipartite polymatroid S ′ = (P, h′) that is com-
patible with Γ . Since σ(S ′) = σ(S), this concludes the proof.
Obviously, |X| ≥ xr and |Y | ≥ y1 for every bipartite access structure Γ with minimal points
{(x1, y1), . . . , (xr, yr)}, and hence the access structure Γ \B has the smallest set of participants among
all bipartite access structures with the same family of minimal points. Therefore, as a consequence of
Proposition 6, the value of κ(Γ ) for a bipartite access structure depends only on the family of minimal
points, and it does not depend on the number of participants in every part. One can prove analogously
that this holds as well for all m-partite access structures with m > 2. The next result proves that the
value of κ(Γ ) for a bipartite access structure depends only on the relative position of its minimal points.
Proposition 7 Let Γ be a bipartite access structure with minΠ(Γ ) = {(x1, y1), . . . , (xr, yr)}. Consider
α = min{i : xi > 0} and β = max{i : yi > 0}. Observe that α ∈ {1, 2} and β ∈ {r − 1, r}. Let B ⊆ P
be such that Π(B) = (xα − 1, yβ − 1). Then κ(Γ/B) = κ(Γ ).
Proof Consider maxΠ(P(P )rΓ ) = {(u1, v1), . . . , (us, vs)}, that is, the family of the points representing
the maximal unqualified subsets. We can suppose that they are ordered in such a way that u1 > · · · > us,
and hence v1 < · · · < vs. It is easy to prove that v1 = yβ − 1 and us = xα− 1. The minimal points of Γ ∗
(ordered in the usual way) are {(x∗1, y∗1), . . . , (x∗s, y∗s )}, where (x∗i , y∗i ) = (|X| − ui, |Y | − vi). Therefore,
Π(P rB) = (|X| − (xα− 1), |Y | − (yβ − 1)) = (x∗s, y∗1). Therefore, by Proposition 6, κ(Γ ∗ \B) = κ(Γ ∗).
Finally, by Propositions 4 and 5, κ(Γ/B) = κ((Γ/B)∗) = κ(Γ ∗ \B) = κ(Γ ∗) = κ(Γ ).
5 Optimal Complexity of Bipartite Access Structures
In this section we present new general lower bounds on the optimal complexity of bipartite access struc-
tures that improve the ones given in [35]. In addition, we present an optimal construction of linear
secret sharing schemes that determines the optimal complexities of all bipartite access structures with
minΠ(Γ ) = {(x1, y1), (x2, 0)}. We begin by recalling the characterization of ideal bipartite access struc-
tures.
Theorem 3 ([35]) Let Γ be a bipartite access structure. Then Γ is a matroid port if and only if
minΠ(Γ ) = min(B1 ∪ B2), where, for some point (x0, y0) ∈ Z2+ and for some integer k with 0 ≤
k ≤ x0 + y0,
– B1 ⊆ {(0, y0), (x0, 0)} and
– B2 = {(x, y) ∈ Z2+ : (x, y) ≤ (x0, y0) and x+ y = k}.
In addition, Γ admits a vector space secret sharing scheme if it is a matroid port. Therefore, λ(Γ ) = 1
if and only if κ(Γ ) = 1 and, moreover, σ(Γ ) ≥ 3/2 if Γ is not ideal.
Differently to the general case, the asymptotic behavior of the parameter σ is known for bipartite
access structures. Actually, if Γ is Π = (P1, P2)-partite, then λ(Γ ) ≤ min{|P1|, |P2|}. This is due to
the fact that the bipartite access structures with one minimal point admit a vector space secret sharing
scheme and minΠ(Γ ) consists of at most min{|P1|, |P2|} points. It can be proved by using well known
basic decomposition techniques (see [39], for instance) that Γ admits a linear secret sharing scheme Σ
with σ(Σ) = |minΠ(Γ )|.
We present next a new lower bound on κ for bipartite access structures. Our result generalize and
improve the bound presented in [35, Proposition 4.1]. First, we present two lemmas that are needed in
the proof of the result. The first one deals with independent sequences in bipartite access structures. The
second one is a consequence of [27, Result 15].
8Lemma 1 Let Γ be a bipartite access structure on a set P . Suppose that there exist a vector (u, v) ∈ Z2+
and a monotone increasing sequence (a1, b1) ≤ · · · ≤ (am, bm) of vectors in P such that, for every
i = 1, . . . ,m, there exists a vector (ui, vi) ≤ (u, v) with (ai + ui, bi + vi) ∈ Π(Γ ) while (am, bm) /∈ Π(Γ )
and (ai−1 +ui, bi−1 + vi) /∈ Π(Γ ) if i ≥ 2. Then Γ admits an independent sequence (B1, . . . , Bm|A) with
length m and size u+ v such that Π(A) = (u, v).
Proof Take subsets B1 ⊆ · · · ⊆ Bm ⊆ P and A ⊆ P such that Π(A) = (u, v), and Π(Bi) = (ai, bi). In
addition, for every i = 1, . . . ,m, consider a subset Xi ⊆ A with Π(Xi) = (ui, vi) and Xi ∩Bi = ∅.
For a polymatroid S = (Q, h) and subsets X,Y, Z ⊆ Q, we notate
– h(X | Y ) = h(X ∪ Y )− h(Y ) ≥ 0,
– i(X;Y ) = h(X)− h(X | Y ) = h(X) + h(Y )− h(X ∪ Y ) ≥ 0, and
– i(X;Y | Z) = h(X | Z)− h(X | Y ∪ Z) ≥ 0.
Lemma 2 ([27]) Let S = (Q, h) be a Γ -polymatroid and X,Y, Z subsets of P = Qr{p0}. If X ∪Z and
Y ∪ Z are in Γ but Z is not in Γ , then i(X;Y |Z) ≥ 1.
Theorem 4 Let Γ be a bipartite access structure with minimal points {(x1, y1), . . . , (xr, yr)}, with x1 = 1
and yr = 0. Consider k = maxi=1,...,r−1(xi+1 − xi) and take s = xr and t = y1. Then
κ(Γ ) ≥ k + s− 2
k + t− 1 .
Proof Consider the vectors (u, v) = (k−1, t) and (ai, bi) = (i−1, 0) for i = 1, . . . , s. For every i = 1, . . . , s,
we define γ(i) as the smallest integer for which xγ(i) ≥ ai. Then for each i = 1, . . . , s, consider the vector
(ui, vi) = (xγ(i)−ai, yγ(i)) ≤ (u, v). From Lemma 1, there is in Γ an independent sequence (B1, . . . , Bm|A)
with length s such that Π(A) = (k−1, t). Then h(A) ≥ s by Theorem 2. Consider A∩P1 = {p1, . . . , pk−1}
and A ∩ P2 = {q1, . . . , qt}. Since (1, t) ∈ minΠ(Γ ), by Lemma 2 we obtain that
h(A) = h(q1) +
t∑
i=2
h(qi | qi−1 . . . q1) + h(p1 | qs+1 . . . q1) +
k−1∑
i=2




h(qi) + h(p1) +
k−1∑
i=2




h(qi) + h(p1) +
k−1∑
i=2




h(qi) + h(p1) +
k−1∑
i=2







h(pi)− (k − 2).
Hence, taking into account the previous inequality it follows that
∑
p∈A h(p) ≥ k + s − 2. Therefore,
there is some p ∈ A that satisfies h(p) ≥ (k + s− 2)/(k + t− 1).
Theorem 4 can be used to find lower bounds on κ(Γ ) for every bipartite access structure Γ , because
κ(Γ ) ≥ κ(Γ ′) for every minor Γ ′ of Γ whose minimal points are in the conditions of Theorem 4. In
addition, other lower bounds can be obtained from that result by changing the order of the parts in the
bipartition of the set of participants. We apply next Theorem 4 to find a lower bound for the particular
case of bipartite access structures having exactly two minimal points.
Corollary 2 Let {(x1, y1), (x2, y2)} be the set of minimal points of a bipartite access structure Γ . If
x1 = y2 = 0, then Γ is ideal. If x1 > 0, then
κ(Γ ) ≥ 2− 1
x2 − x1 .
9Proof Suppose that x1 > 0 and consider B ⊆ P with Π(B) = (x1 − 1, y1 − 1). The minimal points of
the minor Γ/B are {(1, 1), (x2 − x1 + 1, 0)}. By Theorem 4,
κ(Γ/B) ≥ 2(x2 − x1)− 1
x2 − x1 .
The exact values of the optimal complexities of the bipartite access structures with minimal points
minΠ(Γ ) = {(1, 1), (x2, 0)} such that |X| = x2 and |Y | = 1 were given in [33]. Specifically, for those
access structures,
κ(Γ ) = σ(Γ ) = λ(Γ ) = 2− 1
x2 − 1 .
Next theorem generalizes this result. Observe that the number of participants in each part can be
arbitrarily large.
Theorem 5 Let Γ be a bipartite access structure with set of minimal points {(x1, y1), (x2, 0)}, where
x1 > 0. Then
κ(Γ ) = σ(Γ ) = λ(Γ ) = 2− 1
x2 − x1 .
Proof By Corollary 2, κ(Γ ) ≥ 2 − 1/(x2 − x1). The proof is concluded by constructing a linear secret
sharing scheme Σ for Γ whose complexity is equal to this lower bound on κ(Γ ), because then λ(Γ ) ≤
2− 1/(x2 − x1) ≤ κ(Γ ).
Set N1 = |X| and N2 = |Y | and consider a finite field K with |K| > max{N1 + x2 − x1, N2}. The
scheme Σ is constructed by combining two K-linear secret sharing schemes with access structure Γ .
In the first scheme, the secret value k ∈ K is distributed into shares among the participants in X
by using Shamir’s (x2, N1)-threshold scheme. In addition, Shamir’s (x1, N1)-threshold scheme is used to
distribute a random value k1 ∈ K into shares among the participants in X, and the value k2 = k − k1 is
distributed into shares among the participants in Y by Shamir’s (y1, N2)-threshold scheme. We obtain
in this way a K-linear secret sharing scheme Σ1 for Γ such that the secret value and the shares of the
participants in Y are elements in K, while the shares of the participants in X are in K2.
The second linear secret sharing scheme Σ2 for Γ is described in the following. Consider a set Z of
virtual participants with |Z| = x2 − x1. The secret value k ∈ K is distributed into shares among the
participants in X∪Z by using Shamir’s (x2, N1+x2−x1)-threshold scheme, and the share si ∈ K of every
virtual participant i ∈ Z is distributed among the participants in Y by using Shamir’s (y1, N2)-threshold
scheme. Clearly, Σ2 is a K-linear secret sharing scheme for Γ in which the secret value and the shares
of the participants in X are taken from the finite field K while the participants in Y receive a share in
Kx2−x1 .
Finally, a K-linear secret sharing scheme Σ is constructed by combining the scheme Σ2 with x2−x1−1
copies of the scheme Σ1. Specifically, the secret value in the scheme Σ is a vector (k1, k2, . . . , kx2−x1) ∈
Kx2−x1 . Every one of the values k1, k2, . . . , kx2−x1−1 is distributed by using the scheme Σ1, while the
value kx2−x1 is distributed by using the scheme Σ2. Observe that the share of a participant in X is formed
by 2(x2 − x1 − 1) + 1 = 2(x2 − x1)− 1 elements in K, while the share of a participant in Y is formed by
(x2 − x1 − 1) + (x2 − x1) = 2(x2 − x1)− 1 elements in K. Therefore, σ(Σ) = (2(x2 − x1)− 1)/(x2 − x1).
6 A Linear Programming Approach
To find the value of κ(Γ ) for a given access structure Γ can be formulated as a linear programming
problem [16,17,36]. Observe that, by ordering in some way the elements in P(Q), a polymatroid S =
(Q, h) can be represented as a vector (h(A))A⊆Q ∈ Rk, where k = |P(Q)| = 2n+1. By considering an
additional variable v, the value of κ(Γ ) can be computed by solving the optimization problem
Minimize v
subject to (h(A))A⊆Q is a Γ -polymatroid and
v ≥ h({i}) for every i ∈ Q.
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Clearly, the constraints on the vector (v, (h(A))A⊆Q) ∈ Rk+1 are given by linear inequalities, and hence
this is actually a linear programming problem. In general, the number of variables and the number of
constraints grow exponentially with the number of participants. In addition, as it was pointed out in [16,
17], the system of conditions is overdetermined, even after reducing it by using the characterization of
polymatroids given by Matu´sˇ [31].
Nevertheless, if Γ is bipartite, the optimization problem to determine κ(Γ ) can be restricted to
(X,Y, {p0})-partite Γ -polymatroids by Proposition 3. Such a polymatroid S = (Q, h) is determined by its
reduced rank function ĥ : P×{0, 1} → R, where ĥ(x, y, z) = h(A) for every A ⊆ Q with Π(A) = (x, y, z).
Therefore, the value of κ(Γ ) for a bipartite access structure Γ can be determined by solving the linear
programming problem
Minimize v
subject to (ĥ(x))x∈P×{0,1} determines a Π0-partite Γ -polymatroid and
v ≥ ĥ(1, 0, 0) and v ≥ ĥ(0, 1, 0).
In this way, the number of variables has been reduced from 2N1+N2 + 1 to 2(N1 + 1)(N2 + 1) and, as we
will see next, the number of constraints grows also polynomially on the number of participants.
We describe in the following the set of constraints for this linear programming problem. By the
characterization of polymatroids in [31], h : P(Q) → R is the rank function of a Γ -polymatroid if and
only if the following conditions are satisfied.
1. h(∅) = 0.
2. h(Qr {p}) ≤ h(Q) for all p ∈ Q.
3. h(X) + h(X ∪ {p, q}) ≤ h(X ∪ {p}) + h(X ∪ {q}) for all X ⊆ Q and p, q ∈ QrX.
4. h(X ∪ {p0}) = h(X) for every X ∈ minΓ .
5. h(X ∪ {p0}) = h(X) + 1 for every maximal unqualified subset X ⊆ P .
Consider e1 = (1, 0, 0), e2 = (0, 1, 0), and e3 = (0, 0, 1). Therefore, ĥ : P×{0, 1} → R is the reduced rank
function of a Π0-partite Γ -polymatroid if and only if the vector (ĥ(x))x∈P×{0,1} satisfies the following
linear constraints.
1. ĥ(0, 0, 0) = 0.
2. ĥ((N1, N2, 1)− ei) ≤ ĥ(N1, N2, 1) for i = 1, 2, 3.
3. For every pair (i, j) ∈ {1, 2, 3} × {1, 2, 3} with i ≤ j, and for every x ∈ P × {0, 1} such that
x + ei + ej ∈ P× {0, 1},
ĥ(x) + ĥ(x + ei + ej) ≤ ĥ(x + ei) + ĥ(x + ej).
4. ĥ(x, y, 1) = ĥ(x, y, 0) for every (x, y) ∈ minΠ(Γ ).
5. ĥ(x, y, 1) = ĥ(x, y, 0) + 1 for every (x, y) ∈ max(PrΠ(Γ )).
By using this linear programming approach, we have computed the value of κ(Γ ) for several bipartite
access structures.
For instance, some bipartite access structures such that minΠ(Γ ) = {(x1, y1), (x2, y2)} with x1, y2 >
0 and y2−y1 ≤ x2−x1 have been checked, and in all of them the lower bound in Corollary 2 is attained.
Because of that, we conjecture that κ(Γ ) = 2− 1/(x2 − x1) for every such access structure. Recall that
this fact has been proved in Theorem 5 for the case y2 = 0.
A gap in the values of the parameter κ was proved in [29]. Namely, there does not exist any access
structure Γ with 1 < κ(Γ ) < 3/2. The existence of other gaps in the values of this parameter is thus a
natural question. For instance, from the results in [16–18], one could conjecture that, if κ(Γ ) < 2, then
κ(Γ ) = 2−1/s for some positive integer s. Moreover, the values of κ(Γ ) for the bipartite access structures
with two minimal points seem to confirm this conjecture. Nevertheless, we have found some bipartite ac-
cess structure that do not satisfy this property. Specifically, by solving the corresponding linear program-
ming problem, we obtained that the bipartite access structure Γ with minimal points {(1, 4), (3, 3), (5, 1)}
has κ(Γ ) = 22/13. Another example is the structure with minimal points {(1, 4), (4, 3), (6, 1)}, which sat-
isfies κ(Γ ) = 99/53.
Finally, the value of the parameter κ has been computed for a number of bipartite access structures
whose families of minimal points are of the form
{(xi, yi) = (1 +m(i− 1), r − i) : i = 1, . . . , r}
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for some integer m ≥ 2. For all of them, κ(Γ ) equals the lower bound in Theorem 4.
7 Conclusion and Open Problems
In the previous sections, some ideas and techniques to study the optimization of secret sharing schemes
with bipartite access structure have been presented. They improve the first results on this topic that
were presented in [35].
Nevertheless, the problem is very far from being solved for this family. For instance, some fundamental
questions about the construction of optimal linear secret sharing schemes for bipartite access structures
remain open. Namely, it is not known if there exists some separation between the parameters κ and λ
among the bipartite access structures. But even more basic questions have not been solved. For instance,
it is not known whether the value of λ(Γ ) depends only on minimal points of Γ or it depends as well on
the number of participants in each part.
Let Γ be a bipartite access structure such that there exists a K-linear secret sharing scheme Σ for Γ
with complexity σ(Σ) = κ(Γ ). In this situation, κ(Γ ) = λ(Γ ). Moreover, by using a similar argument
as in the proof of Proposition 3, we can assume that S(Σ) is a Π0-partite polymatroid. In particular
S(Σ) \ {p0} is a K-linearly entropic bipartite polymatroid that is compatible with Γ .
Therefore, characterizing the linearly entropic bipartite polymatroids and, by extension, the repre-
sentable integer bipartite polymatroids, are interesting open problems for the optimization of bipartite
secret sharing schemes.
We prove in the following that the uniform integer polymatroids, which are precisely the m-partite
integer polymatroids with m = 1, are representable. In addition, all m-partite matroids with m ≤ 3 are
representable [21]. Unfortunately, this does not apply to bipartite polymatroids. Actually, we present a
bipartite integer polymatroid that is not entropic, and hence it is not representable.
A polymatroid S = (Q, h) is said to be uniform if the value of h(X) depends only on the cardinality of
X, that is, h(X) = h(Y ) if |X| = |Y |. A uniform polymatroid is determined by the values h0, h1, . . . , hn,
where n = |Q| and h(X) = hi if |X| = i. For i = 1, . . . , n, consider the values δi = hi − hi−1, which
form the increment vector (δ1, . . . , δn) of S. A sequence (hi)0≤i≤n of real numbers determines a uniform
polymatroid if and only if h0 = 0 and δ1 ≥ · · · ≥ δn ≥ 0. Obviously, a uniform polymatroid is determined
by its increment vector, and it is an integer polymatroid if and only if its increment vector has integer
components. If S = (Q, h) is a uniform matroid, then there exists an integer r with 0 ≤ r ≤ |Q| such
that the increment vector of S satisfies δi = 1 if i ≤ r and δi = 0 otherwise. We notate Ur,n for such a
uniform matroid. It is well known that the uniform matroid Ur,n is K-representable for every finite field
K with |K| ≥ n.
Proposition 8 Every uniform integer polymatroid is a sum of uniform matroids.
Proof Let S = (Q, h) be a uniform integer polymatroid, with increment vector (δ1, . . . , δn). Then there
exists a sequence of integers n = r0 ≥ r1 ≥ · · · ≥ rδ1 ≥ rδ1+1 = 0 such that rδi ≥ i > rδi+1 for every
i = 1, . . . , n. We claim that S = Ur1,n + · · ·+ Urδ1 ,n. We have to check that δi = δ1i + · · ·+ δδ1i for every
i = 1, . . . , n, where δk is the increment vector of the uniform matroid Urk,n. Recall that δ
k
i = 1 if rk ≥ i
and δki = 0 otherwise.
Theorem 6 Every uniform integer polymatroid is representable, and hence entropic.
Proof Straightforward from Propositions 1 and 8 and the fact that the uniform matroid Ur,n is repre-
sentable over every finite field with at least n elements.
Proposition 9 There exist bipartite integer polymatroids that are not entropic.
Proof The Vamos matroid V is the matroid of dimension four on the set {1, . . . , 8} with rank function r
such that r(A) = 4 for every A ⊆ {1, . . . , 8} of size 4 except {1, 2, 3, 4}, {1, 2, 5, 6}, {3, 4, 5, 6} {3, 4, 7, 8}
and {5, 6, 7, 8}. Take a = {1, 2}, b = {3, 4}, c = {5, 6}, d = {7, 8}, and the set Q = {a, b, c, d}. Let
S = (Q, h) be the integer polymatroid whose rank function is derived from the rank function of V . It
is not difficult to check that S is Π-partite with Π = ({a, b}, {c, d}). Matu´sˇ [32] pointed out that the
rank function of S violates the non-Shannon information inequality given by Zhang and Yeung [43]. This
implies that S is not entropic.
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Nevertheless, Proposition 9 does not exclude the possibility that κ(Γ ) = λ(Γ ) for every bipartite
access structure. Separation results between these parameters could be obtained by adding Ingleton
inequality [25], an information inequality that applies only to linear random variables, to the linear
programming approach that was presented in Section 6. In this way, lower bounds on λ(Γ ) would be
obtained and, maybe, a bipartite access structure with κ(Γ ) < λ(Γ ) could be found. Similarly, the use of
non-Shannon information inequalities, as for instance the one from [43], could provide some separation
result between the parameters κ and σ for bipartite access structures.
As a consequence of the results in [21,35], the existence of a vector space secret sharing for a multi-
partite access structure Γ does not depend on the number of participants in every part, but only on the
minimal points. The same applies to the parameter κ, as we proved in Proposition 6 for the bipartite
case. The validity of a similar result for the parameters σ and λ is an open problem.
Actually, much easier questions remain open about the optimization of bipartite secret sharing
schemes. For instance, even though partial results have been presented in Corollary 2 and Theorem 5,
the problem has not been solved for bipartite access structures with only two minimal points.
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